The revelation of hidden recordings on Frank Balistrieri, Jennie Alioto and Dominic Frinzi launched a whirlwind of memos inside the FBI, IRS, Attorney General’s office and beyond. For those interested in seeing bureaucrats have a meltdown, I encourage looking at the original FBI files on this matter. However, for the sake of keeping the podcast under 10 hours and not putting people to sleep, I’ve done my best to boil it down to more essential points.
The IRS had been actively investigating Balistrieri for years, but seems to have really stepped up their game in 1961, using mail covers to track his expenses and securing affadvaits from people who were familiar with his dealings. They were building a case based on the “net worth expenditure” method of tax fraud – showing he spent more than he had, and was thus concealing assets from the tax authorities.
January 6, 1965: Frank Balistrieri and his bookkeeper Jennie Alioto (2440 North Dousman Street) were indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of tax evasion (conspiracy to defraud the government). They were arrested and released on a $5,000 recognizance bond. Balistrieri had “135 overt acts” of impeding collection and two counts of fraudulent returns for the years 1959 and 1960. The fraudulent returns had him paying $19,200 less in taxes than he should have. The overt acts included using fictitious names, dummy officers, a double set of books and intimidation to keep his income secret.
February 15, 1965: Frank Balistrieri was arraigned on his latest federal tax charges. He pleaded not guilty and trial was set for September 7. On May 6, a newspaper article said Jennie Alioto wanted a separate trial from Frank Balistrieri because being tried together would prejudice the jury against her.
May 18, 1965: An informant told LeGrand and Thompson that Balistrieri seemed worried about losing his tax case but took comfort in knowing that an appeal would take years.
For this stage of the story (see other posts / podcast episodes for earlier pats), we really begin in late 1965. Frank Balistrieri vacated his office at 2641 North Downer on August 14, 1965. He claimed that while moving out, he removed wood paneling and found a recording device that connected to a phone line, and the line ran to a nearby telephone pole. With him at the time of the discovery were Joseph Balistrieri and Carl Dentice. An internal FBI memo notes that this was not their doing – they had previously installed a bug at 2559 North Downer, which they note is a block away, separated by a street. Perhaps the new bug was planted by the IRS, who were also known to do this (because of the IRS having the strictest FOIA rules, we may never know).
State tax authorities weren’t happy, either. On September 2, 1965, state tax agent Edward Ressel wrote a report about trying to collect taxes from Continental Music (2559 Downer) and found it near impossible. The lease on the building was in the name of “Frank Bell,” who was believed to be Frank Balistrieri. No one could be found.
April 5, 1966: An informant said Frank Balistrieri had moved his accounting books to his brother Peter’s house, and Jennie Alioto was still working on them there.
April 26, 1966: US Attorney James Brennan called FBI Agent J. Wallace LaPrade and said that Maurice Walsh, Balistrieri’s attorney, expressed concern that the FBI had hidden microphones inside Balistrieri’s house. What LaPrade said to Brennan I don’t know, but an internal notation on the report says there was no microphone (misur) in the home. Walsh had been attorney for Jimmy Hoffa and Chicago mob boss Tony Accardo.
May 13, 1966: A state tax agen followed up on Continental Music, taking over from Edward Ressel. He wrote in his report the frustration of trying to get tax fro ma business that used fake names and had people running to their cars when he came near. In conclusion he wrote, “Frankly, I never ran into a more evasive group and feel I’ve spent enough time getting nowhere.”
May 18, 1966, Frank Balistrieri (living at 3043 North Shepard Avenue) filed to have his federal tax evasion case moved to the Southern District of Illinois (Springfield), on the grounds that the newspapers of Madison and Milwaukee have given his case too much negative publicity.
May 27, 1966: US Attorney James Brennan told the FBI that Balistrieri had filed a motion to delay his tax trial, and it was scheduled to be heard July 1. His motion for change of venue would likely be brought up at the same time. The defense claimed the press in Milwaukee was “hostile” and would make a fair trial impossible. Brennan said he was not sure what would happen – Judge Robert Tehan was opposed to long trials in summer, Judge Kenneth Grubb was “over the hill” and unpredictable in his actions. The third judge, John Reynolds, could not hear the case because he had previously been attorney general and was seen as prejudiced against Balistrieri. Brennan suspected the case would be pushed to the fall in Springfield with Judge Poos presiding.
Frank Balistrieri’s motion to have his tax case heard in Springfield rather than Milwaukee because of bad press coverage was granted on June 30, 1966 by Judge Omer Poos, who was “on loan” from Springfield to Milwaukee. He said he had discussed it with Milwaukee judges Tehan, Reynolds and Grubb, and felt it was best for him (Poos) to handle it elsewhere. He said he did not want another “Sheppard case” on his hands. Trial was set for October 17. This was very timely – the Sheppard case was decided June 6 before the US Supreme Court, and showed that Dr. Sam Sheppard could not get a fair trial because of negative press coverage. Being fresh in Poos’ mind likely made the change of venue a no-brainer decision. Poos felt he could not preside in Milwaukee because two judges in Illinois had died and he was needed there, thus making a change of venue more convenient than a single judge traveling anyway. The government attorney, Frank Gimbel, said he would have the 750 exhibits and 130 witnesses ready to go.
On September 23 and 26, 1966, Frank Gimbel was in contact hoping to get the “original mail cover” from the Milwaukee FBI for Frank Balistrieri. He had a copy from the IRS but believed the FBI had the original. He knew Balistrieri had received mail from Midwest Scrap Metal and Altex, and wanted to show this, as Balistrieri was expected to deny any connection to these firms. The FBI office found no originals. They believed that the FBI and IRS had simultaneous mail covers and the post office sent the FBI the original and IRS a copy, but it was FBI policy not to keep the “tracing” provided by the post office. They noted that, in the future, they would inform the post office to create two originals – no copies – if multiple agencies had the same request. Long story short, the only existing copy was the IRS carbon copy.
October 10, 1966: An informant said Frank Balistrieri had met with Frank Zito, boss of Springfield, but Zito said there was nothing he could do for him in federal court.
In an interview with Mary Spicuzza, published January 2024, Frank Gimbel said on his drive to Springfield, he stopped at a restaurant in Peoria and received a call from Mitchell Rogovin informing him of the illegal wiretap. Knowing this could crush the case, Gimbel fainted right there in the restaurant. But he was determined to go ahead. (At this point, Gimbel was a prosecutor in his 20s. He would later be a high-profile defense attorney, with clients inclusing Sally Papia.)
October 17, 1966: First day of trial in Springfield. Maurice Walsh filed a motion to suppress the information gathered by hidden microphone in Balistrieri’s tax case.
October 17, 1966: In relation to the suppression motion, Carla DeLoach sent a long memo to Clyde Tolson relaying conversations had with the acting attorney general and related matters. Two parts of this memo stand out for me. One, DeLoach thought the best course of action would be to get a continuance in the Balistrieri case. The reason being was that the “Black” case was before the Supreme Court, and it would be best to see how that went. DeLoach feared if more publicity was given to government surveillance before the Black decision, the Supreme Court would come down harder on them. Two, there was discussion of whether the government should admit bugging Dominic Frinzi. The FBI naturally did not want this known, as it was embarassing and almost certainly illegal. However, there was concern that Maurice Walsh would get it made public anyway. The memo called him “completely unsavory,” but acknowledged he was “a very knowledgeable and capable attorney.” It might, therefore, be better to come clean early before Walsh started making too much progress. Assistant attorney general Mitchell Rogovin made the decision to speak to the trial judge in private where he revealed the existence of the Frinzi bug but assured the judge it had no relevance and asked it to be sealed. The judge said he appreciated the government’s “forthrightness” and there would be no mention of the Frinzi bug at trial.
October 18, 1966: Rogovin feared that although the judge had blocked Walsh from talking about bugs, he would ask questions to get people to mention them on the stand. He felt Walsh would sooner or later get to the point where three FBI agents would have to testify. Carla DeLoach told him that it would be “undesirable” to have any agents testify, but if it was the only thing possible to prevent a mistrial, he would allow agents to submit pre-written affidavits. On DeLoach’s memo, Hoover wrote, “In any event, I want true and full facts presented. I want no coaching of our agents nor of any ex-agents.” In another part, DeLoach wrote that Rogovin felt the judge had “a very healthy respect” for the FBI and would not allow embarrassing questions. Hoover noted, “It would be well if Rogovin had the same (respect for FBI).” If the issue of trespass were to come up, agents were advised to testify that AG Bobby Kennedy specifically requested the microphones to investigate the Biernat murder and there was no intention of gathering information on tax offenses. (The memo is very long and I did not take detailed notes here.)
Evening of October 18: Alexander LeGrand called the Milwaukee FBI and let them know he and Richard Thompson, both retired, were heading to Springfield on the expectation they would be called to testify. LeGrand wanted to know if the FBI had any objections. The office said whether they are called or not was completely in the hands of the US Attorney.
October 19, 1966: JH Gale sent a memo to Carla DeLoach saying that Hoover wanted record of the authorization on the three Balistrieri-related microphones. Hoover noted on this memo that he authorized a Balistrieri microphone but the other two were signed off on by Tolson.
October 19, 1966: DeLoach wrote a memo to Tolson, clarifying that Bobby Kennedy did not ask for the microphone “per se” but had asked for increased investigation of the Biernat murder. He made this request to former assistant director Evans, and the FBI response was that the FBI had no jurisdiction. Kennedy pushed back on this and “very definitely” got the FBI mixed up in the case. DeLoach said that Kennedy’s “general authorization” to investigate made him responsible for the FBI’s actions, including the microphone. DeLoach wanted to emphasize he had not “misled” anyone by saying Kennedy was responsible. Hoover wrote on this memo, “Evans certainly failed to properly protect FBI interests. Let me see the memo which I approved authorizing this microphone”
Around October 19, John Holtzman testified. Defense attorney Walsh asked him if there was trespass involved in planting microphones. He said he would plead the Fifth before answering. The court recessed a moment and attorneys met in the judge’s chambers. The government pointed out that Holtzman was now a magistrate in Peoria, Illinois, so this would be embarrassing to him. Further the government already conceded trespass, so there was no need to have individual agents repeat it. Walsh spoke with Balistrieri, and he agreed it would be okay to drop the question. Holtzman did say that in addition to him, 22 other FBI employees had monitored the microphone at one time or another. (Holtzman did not volunteer this number, but confirmed a notation Walsh found on a record.) Rogovin told the FBI that he was considering dropping the conspiracy aspects of his case – it would be harder to convict, but would make the need for additional FBI testimony go away. DeLoach wrote a memo to Tolson outlining all this. Hoover wrote on there, “I still don’t know why Dept starts cases where microphones have been used when all they have to do is to check with FBI first to ascertain such usage… It looks to me as if Dept is constantly putting FBI on trial instead of hoodlums.” (Does this means Hoover thinks no cases can go forward if microphones were involved? Wouldn’t that, therefore, suggest it was a bad idea to ever use the microphones in the first place?) Hoover also seemed surprised so many employees needed to monitor a microphone. (Upon checking, they found the main reason was the extended period of time and long hours, but it also served as the job agents were put on when injured or had a small workload, so some people were rotated in for short stints.)
October 20, 1966: If I understand this correctly, the judge gave the government the choice of going forward with conspiracy charges or tax charges, but not both. They picked the tax charges. This removed the need to involve the FBI agents any further, and the judge set the next date at October 25. (This moved the trial from motions stage to actual trial, I think.)
On October 25, 1966, tax agent Frank Provinzano testified that he had met Frank Balistrieri years before (possibly 1954) in the federal building and helped him falsify his net worth. Balistrieri allegedly gave him some penciled figures saying his net worth in 1949 was $23,101 and was $34,172 in 1953. Provinzano then typed these up and inserted them into the government’s records. (Balistrieri would years later allege that no such meeting ever happened. He claimed that Provinzano, who was gay, was blackmailed by the IRS into making up this story.)
Around November 3, there was again an attempt to bring former FBI agents to Balistrieri’s tax trial in an attempt to ascertain their relationship with the phone company. The FBI considered this a “fishing expedition,” especially because the agents wanted were now in Detroit, Kansas City and New York, and couldn’t just travel on a whim.
At trial on November 3, 1966, IRS agent Reginald(?) L. Jackson testified how on October 7, 1962, an order was issued to arm IRS agents, which was not common. The reason for this was because they had received a tip that someone would try to break into the IRS office and steal papers related to Frank Balistrieri. To prevent this, agents were armed and even stayed in the office on a Sunday, as well as given a license plate to be on the lookout for. Jackson had received the tip from another IRS agent, Ernest Johannes. When asked who told Johannes, Jackson was told, “The less you know the better.” Johannes was called to testify and claimed to be unaware of any of this. “I have no idea what this relates to, what this relates to at all,” he said. Jackson’s testimony was read back to him, and now Johannes recalled that he had received the tip from FBI agent John Gassoway. The suspected break-in was going to be perpetrated by “an IRS employee who has since left the service.” Johannes did not publicly say who the suspect was, but said the armed agents had the man’s license plate number and were on the lookout for his car. Regardless, the break-in apparently never happened and no records were stolen. (My first guess is the ex-agent was Provinzano, but I have nothing to really back that up.)
November 3, 1966: Milwaukee’s sound-trained agent (redacted) was called to testify about surveillance on Balistrieri, Jennie Alioto and Dominic Frinzi. The defense asked probing questions, but SAC Fields advised his superiors that (redacted) “made an outstanding witness.” The acting attorney general also advised the FBI that the agent was an “excellent witness” with his “firm, decisive” answers.
November 4, 1966: Balistrieri’s tax case was adjourned until November 14. Oscar Rohr, a Milwaukee jeweler who had testified at trial about selling a ring to Frank’s son, reported to the US Attorney that his rear tire appeared to be slashed during trial and he suspected a friend of Frank’s did it. However, without any evidence (beyond the tire), no further investigation was made into the claim.
November 7, 1966: As part of a memo from JH Gale to Deke DeLoach, he suggested the idea of transferring certain FBI agents from the Milwaukee office elsewhere. He suspected Dominic Frinzi was preparing a lawsuit, and be moving agents from the state, it could make it more of a challenge to get them to testify in state court. The memo also said the FBI should continue to fight having agents testify in the Balistrieri case, and Hoover agreed. (On the premise that the IRS case was not tainted by FBI bugs, there is no reason for the FBI to testify.)
November 10, 1966: Gale sent a memo to DeLoach about a “conference” held with Rogovin. It was determined defense (Walsh) would keep trying to call more FBI personnel, but it wouldn’t change the outcome of the tax trial. Hoover made a note on the memo, “Just a fishing expedition.” (I think the important thing here is that Walsh is only half trying to get the case tossed. He’s probably equally interested in getting as many people to go public with the FBI’s abuse of privacy.)
November 17-18, 1966: Balistrieri trial was recessed because of a sick juror. It was to restart December 1, with the government expected to wrap up their side of the trial by December 3.
November 21, 1966: US Attorney Brennan spoke with the Milwaukee SAC. He said he expected Walsh to try a “summing up”motion after the prosecution finished to again suggest FBI bugs tainted the case. Brennan confidentially told the SAC that he heard Walsh was in communication with high profile attorney E. Bennett Williams who was working on a similar trial for ?? Baker. The two were discussing strategy, with an emphasis on getting FBI agents to testify to embarrassing stuff.
November 29, 1966: Maurice Walsh suffered a coronary thrombosis (heart attack) and was hospitalized. It was expected he would not be able to defend Balistrieri for a few weeks.
December 5, 1966: In response to Walsh’s medical emergency, Judge Poos postponed the trial for 90 days (March 1). We’ll pick up there next time.